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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas Chandler Sorensen appeals from his convictions for eluding and two
counts of violating a no-contact order. He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress
and his sentences.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A police officer pulled over Sorensen's truck for a broken passenger side taillight
and expired registration. (47014 R., p. 34.) A female passenger in the truck identified
herself as "Barbra Herrick," but there was no such person in police databases. (47014 R.,
p. 34.) Another officer called to the scene recognized the female passenger as Julie Harris,
a person Sorensen was to have no contact with pursuant to a no-contact order. (47014 R.,
p. 29.) When officers ordered Sorensen from the vehicle, he initially refused to get out,
and when officers moved to remove him he drove off. (47014 R., pp. 25, 27, 31-32, 3435.) As he drove off he ran over an officer's foot. (47014 R., p. 29.) Officers chased
Sorensen until his truck stopped because of mechanical failure. (47014 R., pp. 25, 27, 29.)
The state charged Sorensen with eluding, battery on an officer with a deadly
weapon enhancement, four counts of violating a no-contact order, resisting officers, driving
without privileges and no insurance. (47014 R., pp. 84-91.) He moved to suppress the
evidence against him. (47014 R., pp.114-15.) The district court denied the motion. (47014
R., p. 127; 9-11-18 Tr., p. 26, L. 13 - p. 29, L. 10.) Thereafter the parties entered a plea
agreement and Sorensen pled guilty to eluding, preserving the right to appeal from the
denial of his suppression motion, and the state dismissed the other counts. (47014 R., pp.

1

146-50.) The district court sentenced Sorensen to five years with two years determinate.
(47014 R., pp. 174-76.) Sorensen filed a timely notice of appeal. (47014 R., pp. 181-83.)
The state also charged Sorensen in a second case with four counts of violation of a
no-contact order. (47015 R., pp. 36-39.) Pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to
two counts of violation of a no-contact order and the state dismissed the other counts.
(47015 R., pp. 71-73, 75-76.) The district court imposed sentences of five years with two
years fixed, concurrent with each other but consecutive to the eluding sentence in the other
case. (47015 R., pp. 93-95.) Sorensen filed a timely notice of appeal. (47015 R., pp. 9799.)
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ISSUES
Sorensen

I.

II.

states the issues

Whether the

0n appeal

as:

district court erred in

Docket N0. 47014 by denying

Mr. Sorensen’s motion

t0 suppress.

Whether the

court abused

district

its

discretion

by imposing

excessive sentences on Mr. Sorensen in both cases.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Sorensen

failed t0

ofﬁcer conducting the

show
initial

error in the district court’s determination that the

trafﬁc stop

had reasonable suspicion 0f a trafﬁc

Violation?

2.

Has Sorensen

failed to

show that the

district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Sorensen Has Failed To

Show Error In The

Ofﬁcer Conducting The

Initial

District Court’s Determination

Trafﬁc Stop

Had Reasonable

Suspicion

That The

Of A Trafﬁc

Violation

A.

Introduction
In denying Sorensen’s suppression motion, the district court found that the ofﬁcer

conducting the trafﬁc stop had reasonable suspicion that Sorensen’s
taillight

—

L. 7

was emitting White

p. 28, L. 7.)

The

light in Violation

0f the applicable

district court also

passenger

rear,

(9-1 1-18

statute.

TL,

p. 27,

found that the ofﬁcer also had reasonable

suspicion that the truck had an expired registration. (9-1 1-18 Tr., p. 28, L. 25

—

p. 29, L.

10.)

“Mindful” that the

and

district court’s rulings are

credibility determinations,

based on

Sorensen asserts that the

reasonable suspicion for the stop.

district court’s denial

B.

Standard

has failed t0 show clear

and those factual ﬁndings support the

Of Review
suppress

court’s ﬁndings of fact that are supported

The

He

by ﬁnding

of the motion t0 suppress.1

“When a decision 0n a motion t0

1

conﬂicting evidence

district court erred

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

error in the district court’s factual ﬁndings, however,

(at best)

state notes that

by

is

challenged, the Court accepts the

trial

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the

nothing in the record shows that the suppression motion (alleging an

illegal trafﬁc stop) related t0

any evidence relevant

to the charges t0

which Sorensen

ultimately pled guilty (eluding, which obviously did not involve a seizure, and Violations

0f no-contact orders in a different case and relating t0 a different day).
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application of constitutional principles t0 the facts as found.” State V. Mullins, 164 Idaho

493, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (internal citations omitted).

Sorensen Has Failed T0

C.

Unsupported

BV

Show That The

more analogous

to

Are

Substantial Evidence

“Because a routine trafﬁc stop
is

District Court’s Factual Findings

is

normally limited in scope and 0f short duration,

an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore

analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” State

V.

v.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1,

it

is

88 S.Ct. 1868, 20

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App.

2003). “Under the Fourth

Amendment, an ofﬁcer may stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible

criminal behavior if there

is

a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle

is

being

driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws.” State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct.

App. 2004).

The evidence
trier

in this case

of fact would accept

has been proven.”’

it

was

substantial.

and rely upon

it

“Evidence

in determining

is

substantial if a ‘reasonable

Whether a disputed point 0f fact

State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712,

215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009)

(quoting State V. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960, 961 (Ct. App. 1997) (brackets

omitted».

In this case the district court considered both the ofﬁcer’s testimony and the

Video 0fthe stop and concluded the evidence proved reasonable suspicion that the coverless
taillight

—

emitted white light and that the registration was expired. (9-1 1-18 Tr., p. 27, L. 7

p. 29, L. 10.)

The

district court’s decision that the

conduct a trafﬁc stop 0n these two bases

On

appeal Sorensen

is

is

ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion t0

supported by the law and the

mindful that the evidence

is

facts.

substantial, but

he claims

it is

conﬂicting, and that the district court should therefore have reached the opposite

conclusion. (Appellants brief, p. 7.) First, there

from the stop conﬁrms the ofﬁcer’s testimony
white

light.

(E Exhibit A.)

The

(9-1 1-18 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 14-23),

district court

and

is

n0 conﬂict

in the evidence.

that the taillight

noted that color

that the matter

may

had no cover and emitted
is

was

that the coverless taillight emitted White light

reasonable.

Nor

is

there

hard to see in the Video

not have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt (9-1 1-18 T11, p. 28, Ls. 8-16), but that does not

ﬁnding

show

that the registration

(9-1 1-18 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 13-14 (“I also noticed the registration sticker

in a report not prepared

by

some testimony about

on the

Second, even
not

is

show

clear error.

if

was

was

expired.

expired.”).)

a second license plate

was evidence

that the ofﬁcer did not see

On

number

the ofﬁcer (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing Tr., p. 20, L. 17

21, L. 3)), but he does not claim there

registration sticker

clear error in the

and therefore the ofﬁcer’s suspicion

any conﬂicting evidence

appeal Sorensen notes that there was

The Video

— p.

an expired

license plate.

Sorensen had shown there was conﬂicting evidence, such would

“Substantial evidence

solely circumstantial or

When

there

is

may

exist

even When the evidence presented

conﬂicting evidence.”

State V. Southwick, 158

Idaho 173, 178, 345 P.3d 232, 237 (Ct. App. 2014). The evidence that the rear passenger
taillight

was emitting White

light

and

that the license plate bore

sticker supports the district court’s factual ﬁndings,

had reasonable suspicion

t0 stop the truck.

and thus

its

an expired registration

conclusion that the ofﬁcer

II.

Sorensen Has Failed T0
A.

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Sentencing Discretion

Its

Introduction

The

district court

imposed sentences of ﬁve years With two years determinate

the eluding (47014 R., pp. 174-76) and

for

ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed, concurrent with

each other but consecutive t0 the eluding sentence in the other case, on the two convictions

Sorensen argues the

for Violating a no-contact order (47015 R., pp. 93-95).

abused

its

sentence

discretion because “the mitigating factors demonstrate that a

was

appropriate.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)

Review of the

district court

more

lenient

record, however,

shows n0 abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007) (citing State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002);

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

that the

the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term 0f conﬁnement.

Tre—Vino,

132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence

the appellant bears the burden 0f demonstrating that

Laker,

it is

is

831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

Li

(citing

within statutory limits,

V.

m

Lundguist, 134 Idaho

In evaluating Whether a lower court abused

appellate court conducts a four—part inquiry,

m

ﬁxed portion 0f

a clear abuse 0f discretion.

136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State

m

its

Which asks “whether the

discretion, the

trial court:

(1)

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries 0f

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc

choices available t0

and

it;

(4)

Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

reached

its

decision

by

429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018)

the exercise 0f reason.”

(citing

Lunneborg

State V.

My Fun Life,

V.

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Sorensen Has Failed T0

C.

To bear

Show An Abuse Of Discretion

establish that, under

any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

m,

144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

appellant

met

this

m,

on parole

is

excessive.

In determining Whether the

be the period of actual incarceration.

161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing
at 391).

T0

m

exclusively the province 0f the executive branch,

that the determinate portion Will

170 P.3d

was

must

burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision

t0 release the defendant

presumes

m

the burden of demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant

establish that the sentence

was

m,

144 Idaho

726,

at

excessive, the appellant

must

demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate t0

accomplish the sentencing goals 0f protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution.

Faiell, 144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401.

A

sentence

is

reasonable “‘if

it

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary obj ective ofprotecting society and to achieve

any or
Idaho

all

at

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r retribution.

9”

895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

m,

1, 8,

161

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2015)).

Sorensen’s criminal conduct caused considerable harm, both an injury that could

have been

far

more

serious to an ofﬁcer

whose

foot Sorensen ran over and the

psychological and physical abuse he heaped 0n the Victim of the no-contact order
Violations.

(PSI, pp. 4-6.)

He

has a considerable criminal record, including convictions

for ten misdemeanors and one prior felony. (PSI, pp. 6-15.) His crimes include crimes of
violence and property theft. (Id.) Efforts at rehabilitation include numerous probations
and two riders. (PSI, pp. 6-15, 20.) He was deemed to be a high risk of re-offense. (PSI,
p. 22.) The district court considered the record, the relevant law, and imposed a reasonable
sentence. (3-27-19 Tr., p. 29, L. 19 – p. 35, L. 19.)
Sorensen asserts he would be successful at rehabilitation if “the underlying issue is
actually addressed.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) However, the record does not demonstrate
that Sorensen’s issues with substance abuse and mental health are “the underlying issue.”
First, there is no evidence that substance abuse or mental illness played any role in the
current crimes of eluding and violating his no-contact order. He apparently committed
these crimes stone-cold sober, and there is no evidence that any mental health issue played
any role in his criminal actions. (PSI, pp. 57-67.) Second, although the record does suggest
Sorensen has abused substances significantly over the years, there is no evidence of any
actual mental health issues. (PSI, pp. 19-20.) Sorensen reported that “he has never
undergone a mental health evaluation before,” had never taken medication or undergone
counselling for a mental health, and described his mental health as “‘great.’” (PSI., p. 19.)
The only evidence in the record is that Sorensen believed he would benefit from “grief
counseling, anger management and in learning coping skills.” (PSI., p. 19.) Sorensen has
not shown on this record that the district court abused its discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the order denying suppression

and the judgment of conviction.

DATED this

11th day of December, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of December, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
I

by means of iCourt

File

and Serve:

BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

KKJ/dd
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